
This Christmas, I have been reading the latest report on the conflicts in Eastern DR Congo by Global Witness. It documents how “all the main warring parties are heavily involved in the mineral trade in North and South Kivu”, both rebels and the national Congolese army (FARDC). Their involvement includes the use of forced labour, systematic extortion, illegal “taxes” on the civilian population, as well as outright violence. In the Bisie mine in North Kivu, an army brigade operated as rogue feudal landlords for almost three years, reaping huge profits by taxing the miners. Their commander, Colonel Sammy Matumo, has not faced any disciplinary or legal action.
The FARDC and the FDLR (remnants of the old genocidal regime in Rwanda), who are supposed to be enemies, sometimes cooperate on this lucrative business, “carving up territory and mining areas through mutual agreement and sometimes sharing the spoils”.
Natural resource rents are keeping the conflict in Eastern Congo alive, providing various armed groups both with a means and a motive to keep fighting. Foreign companies play their part, as do various intermediaries Global Witness, having contacted more than 200 companies doing business in the DRC, reports “a lack of a sense of urgency and limited commitment to applying checks throughout the entire supply chain” of the major electronics companies. Minerals such as coltan, cassiterite and wolframite are used in the manufacture of electronic goods such as telephones and gaming consoles. Watch NRK’s excellent documentary “Connecting people” to learn more (in Norwegian).
The results? A decade of conflict. Millions dead. GDP at below 1975 levels and a HDI of 0.389. In July this year, there were around two million internally displaced people. When I visited the DRC in April this year, an Oxfam aid worker told me that none of the IDPs he had interviewed were on the run for the first time, nor the second. A few for the third time, while most were fleeing from their homes for the fourth or fifth time in a few years.
What is happening in Congo is an example of what economists have dubbed the “resource curse” – a somewhat broad term referring to the observation that countries endowed with natural resources tend to perform worse than others in terms of economic and human development. This is why oil has been dubbet “the Devil’s excrement” – a description which would be just as fitting for Congolese minerals. This happens through various mechanisms – promotion of corruption and clientalism, dutch disease, volatility of prices – and armed conflict. Natural resource reserves are both an attractive prize to claim and a means to fund an army, and therefore work to increase the chance of civil war.
Or do they?
World Bank economist Paul Collier, one of the big shots on this field of research, has found a correlation between resource dependence and war. He is being challenged by Christa Brunnschweiler and Erwin Bulte, who in a recent paper claim that the relation might be just the opposite:
Countries with more abundant natural capital appear to have a lower probability of becoming engaged in civil war. However, civil war tends to disrupt manufacturing and scare investors away, thus leading to increased dependence upon natural resources. The relation appears not to be natural resource dependency -> civil war, but civil war -> natural resource dependency.
(Look to Norway! To Botswana! To the admittedly undemocratic, but nevertheless stable petrostates of the Middle East!)
Why do Collier and Brunnschweiler/Bulte arrive at different conclusions? Basically, because they measure resource dependency differently. Collier looks at resource dependence, measured as natural resource exports as a percentage of GDP. This measure may be problematic. A poor country will be counted as being more resource abundant than a rich country with the same amount of resources. Brunnschweiler and Bulte use resource abundance as a starting point, the net present value in US dollars per capita of the natural resource stock of a country, and derive resource dependence through a more complex equation.
As a consequence, Brunnschweiler and Bulte argues, the label ‘resource curse’ may be misplaced, and common sense as we have leaned to know it could be turned upside down. Maybe. But some of the most conflict-promoting resources, such as diamonds, are not included in their dataset, and the final verdict is yet to be issued on the resource/war link.
To the people dying in the coltan mines of Congo, however, the resource curse is very much a reality. While the results of a generalized statistical regression may point in one direction or another, natural resources clearly has the potential both to fuck up a country (DRC) and make it filthy rich (Norway). As Ragnar Torvik writes, «[t]he most interesting aspect of resource abundant countries is not their average performance, but their huge variation. Resource abundant countries constitute some of the richest and some of the poorest countries in the world». Can we get closer to the answer by looking more closely at different policies and institutions?
I was intrigued enough by this to make it the subject of my term paper in political economy and macroeconomics. You can read it here. This has also been the subject of a recent article in New York Times.